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Abstract |  During the last months, many dramatic events concerning the Middle Eastern geo-political 
scenario have focused the global attention on the rise of the Islamic State and, in particular, on both the  
brutality and the expertise that characterize the visual strategies of communication of this new jihadist  
extreme fringe. But, in order to understand better the current relationship between Islamic radicalism 
and our mediascape, it might be useful to take a step back, deepening the use of new technological 
devices and digital media promoted by Al-Qaeda (the most relevant terroristic organization operative in 
the last decade), especially after the 9/11 attacks and during the consequent War on Terror. Therefore  
the  article  attempts  to  do  this,  firstly  choosing  a  peculiar  point  of  view  for  the  analysis  (the 
contemporary  strategies  of  self-configuration  in  wartime)  and  secondly  examining  two  exemplar 
matters  on the topic:  bin  Laden's  self-iconography  (composed by a  large  numer of  video-messages  
performed by the Saudi sheik from 2001 to his death) and the increasingly media importance gained by 
the Islamic shahid (a suicide-bomber who is also the author of a striking video-testament that precedes 
his final action of death).
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At the end of 2001, in the aftermath of Al-Qaeda's spectacular attacks, the formula “post-9/11” was 
incessantly repeated, both in institutional and informal speeches, revealing the need to synthesize a 
common expression able to fulfill  a double function: on the one hand, to summarize the great 
importance of that day, considering it metaphorically as an historical watershed (Dudziak, 2003); 
on the other hand, to render an emotional and shared meaning to the state of emergency which 
arose after that awful event (Carbone, 2007). Until autumn 2008, when global economy started to 
collapse and crisis substituted terror on the “stage of urgency”, this formula – post-9/11– was, in 
other words, the recurrent term used to designate a very traumatic turn of the millennium.
Among its several meanings, 9/11 is also the most relevant casus belli in recent history. After that, 
as is well known, a particular kind of war, called War on Terror, was launched: at the same time, a  
reactive (Afghanistan) and a preventive (Iraq) war were declared against Global Terrorism1, which 
gathers under the word “enemy” a complex and messy system of terroristic organizations hard to 
define within traditional geo-political boundaries and built around the sharp and whiskered face of 
Saudi sheik Osama bin Laden.
Nevertheless, the first scenario (Afghanistan),  which has become the longest conflict  ever 
fought by the United States in their history, was soon described as a «forgotten war» (Ricchiardi,  
2006): a context where, with a few stellar exceptions, media largely ignored the fighting because 
they operated under a choking state pressure; on the other hand, the second (Iraq) represents the 
main war frontline, where the visuality of war has been updated by the contemporary proliferation 
of multiple points of view involved in the conflict, the spread of portable audiovisual devices used 
to  take  and  reproduce  pictures,  and  the  introduction  of  innovative  networked  platforms  of 
communication (such as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube).
In  fact,  the  War on Terror  is  the  first  war  increasingly  fought  online2,  where  those who 
struggle try to take advantage of new communication technologies, such a crucial instrument in the 
field of contemporary warfare that  has been able to promote the online space as an important 
showcase  of  the  conflict.  In  this  sense,  the  concrete  (and  atavistic)  idea  of  the  battlefield  is  
relaunched in a virtual landscape formed by collective imagination and data exchanges, just as the 
idea of the war frontline becomes a diffused horizon (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2010; Roger 2013). 
Therefore,  this  is  a  scenario  that  transforms  the  global  net  of  digital  communications into  an 
unprecedented field of clash, as well as pictures into a powerful new offensive instrument, profiling 
a  war  –  according  to  W.  J.  T.  Mitchell  – “fought  by  means  of  images  deployed  to  shock and 
traumatize  the  enemy,  images  meant  to  appall  and  demoralize,  images  designed  to  replicate 
1 The adjective “global” means that many theatres of war have been defined (or redefined) in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. Among them are the Middle-East (Lebanon and Gaza Strip), the North of the Caucasus (Chechnya), South  
Asia (India, North-East Pakistan) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines), a part of Africa (the Horn and some 
Saharan countries), South America (Colombia).
2 Actually, the first war in which the Internet is present is the Kosovo War (1998-1999), but its functionality is rather  
restricted and therefore not very significative.
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themselves endlessly and to infect the collective imaginary of global populations” (Mitchell, 2011: 
2-3). But this is also a war where the conception of image as simulacrum – a notion developed with 
a suspicious and postmodern mindset during the Gulf War in 1990-1991 (Baudrillard, 1991) –  has 
become weak, unable to ask the appropriate questions to its own time. Indeed, if we can surely say  
that reality is not disappearing, dissolved in the variety of its representations, we can also guess  
that nowadays another examination of the ontological unreality of images (especially digital ones) 
seems to be less useful than a meticulous study conducted on their  operative reality, a primary 
perspective in the background of the War on Terror.
Consequently,  we must interpret the war imagination shaped in the first decade of the new 
millennium as a complex, chaotic and cacophonous reality that requires some “exploratory paths” 
in order to be investigated. The path chosen in these pages is the self-configuration in the new 
media landscape: a model often employed by the current media system to negotiate the visibility of 
contemporary conflicts, as shown by several episodes of international news that marked the last 
decade and the fighting of the War on Terror. From the participative and citizen journalism (such 
as  the  so-called  warblogs)  to  the  video-footages  directly  shot  and  edited  by  the  soldiers  and 
uploaded to file-sharing platforms3, from the Internet to the entertainment industry4, nowadays 
various forms of self-representation take part decisively in the visual processes of the conflict, in its 
sale as a product for the audience, in its propaganda mechanisms.
Clearly,  self-definition  through images  within  the  war  experience  is  not  a  contemporary 
discovery (Struk, 2011). But in our mediascape, it  is evident that the “war self-portraiture” has 
attained a significant sudden rise, to such an extent that today it can be interpreted as the main 
outcome of a complete permeation between actors in war and recording equipments, due to the 
proliferation of new devices, their increasing handiness and the low threshold of ability required in 
their use. 
Among the results of this renewed relationship between human subjects and media system, it 
is possible to highlight an exacerbation of the already proverbial ambiguity of the verb  to shoot 
(firing  a  shot,  taking  a  picture),  starting  with  the  fact  that  the  photo/video  camera  (now 
incorporated  in  many  other  technological  devices)  has  become  an  ever-present  accessory  in 
everyone's war equipment. It is an exacerbation that creates a large confusion among those who 
claim the role of operators of visibility in an increasingly mediatized war (Cottle 2006), because it 
places the war self-portraiture among the so-called amateur images: a peculiar kind of images that 
has  been  a  phenomenon  of  some  importance  since  the  end  of  the  19th century  (especially 
concerning private production and consumption), but now influences in a really decisive manner 
the  public  and  popular  mediatization  of  the  conflict.  Indeed,  mainstream  circuits  of 
3 In this sense, it seems very significant the difference between two collective conceptions: one that depicts the Gulf  
War as the “first TV-war”, similar to a video-game; the other that depicts the Iraq War as the “first YouTube war”,  
similar to a reality show. See Hammond P. (2007).
4 Among the most significant self-representation attempts from the state of conflict produced for the entertainment  
industry, we can remember the movie  Redacted (B. De Palma, USA 2007), the documentaries  The War Tapes (D. 
Scranton, USA 2006), Armadillo (J. Metz, Denmark 2010) and Restrepo (T. Hetherington & S. Junger, USA 2010), 
the TV-series Generation Kill (HBO, 2008), Homeland (Showtime, 2011) and Our War (BBC Three, 2011), the TV-
programme Iraq Uploaded (MTV News, 2006).
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communication  and information often use  the plurality  of  images which refer  to  the conflict's 
private dimension in order to integrate their official narrations (Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti, 
2011).
In this sense,  the most remarkable case in recent times is  probably the diffusion of  Abu  
Ghraib snapshots (we commemorate just this year their tenth anniversary).  In April 2004, the 
television programme 60 Minutes and some articles published by Seymour M. Hersh on «The New 
Yorker» reported to public attention a shocking case of war tortures.  The cause of the scandal 
relates not only to what the images show (notoriously,  a group of western soldiers oblige Iraqi 
prisoners to submissive positions, often with evident sexual connotations), but also to the shocking 
revelation about the identity of their authors: photographs and videos were shot by the captors,  
who are authors of a self-portraiture gesture performed  in front of and  behind the camera – a 
gesture that, in some way, reconsiders even the role of the war reporter, replacing his function and 
his presence5. 
The  pictures  from  Abu  Ghraib  are  grainy  and  taken  in  low  resolution,  but  the  spatial 
distribution reveals a work of coordination and planning, activities linked to the idea of  a real 
“staging”:  the soldiers’  behaviour  displays an ostentatious bullying and an iconography of self-
affirmation that testifies the desire to demonstrate an ideological superiority resorting to a boasting 
bodily preponderance (for example, the folded arms or the thumbs up). Moreover, going beyond 
the specific contents, it is also possible to observe – as Susan Sontag has noted approaching these 
infamous images – that in the Iraqi prison the act of photographing has become itself an exercise of 
torture infliction (2003).
Nevertheless, and in order to address the main issue indicated by the title of this paper, in the 
context of contemporary war self-portraiture it is now necessary to narrow the focus of analysis to a 
particular field, taking into consideration the self-configurative strategies adopted specifically by 
Al-Qaeda, the most relevant terroristic organization active in the last decade (Gray, 2003; Cook, 
2005). This choice might seem to be a contradiction, a paradox, because it immediately reveals a  
problematic relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and new visual technologies: indeed, 
Islam  forbids  the  creation  of  anthropomorphic  images,  or  images  of  animated  subjects,  since 
Islamic visual culture, according to the precepts asserted in the Quran, is basically an-iconic (that 
is, devoid of figurative images, stigmatized as unholy) and only authorizes the representation of 
patterns  of  expression  unrelated  to  reality,  thus  opting  for  an  elaborate  decorativism  full  of 
symbolic meanings (Belting, 2011).
Therefore, the aforementioned paradox is that in Islamic radicalism (namely where it is quite licit 
to  expect  an  inflexible  deference  to  the  Quranic  tradition)  we  should  not  find  traces  of  self-
representations; yet, they have become an invaluable weapon for both terroristic propaganda and 
proliferation, especially during the War on Terror. Under these circumstances, let us now consider 
two case studies: Osama bin Laden's self-iconography and the video-testaments shot by Al-Qaeda's  




A digital ghost: Osama bin Laden's self-iconography
Osama  bin  Laden  became  a  worldwide  famous  figure,  easily  identifiable  with  some  peculiar 
features: turban, long beard, index finger raised in the air, as if he were putting an evil spell on his  
enemies.  We  mistook  him  for  a  messenger  coming  from  a  remote  past,  the  spokesman  of  a  
barbarian Middle Ages who emerged into present bringing an ancient and frightful threat with him. 
His face kept us company for ten years, printed on the front pages of the world's most important 
newspapers, appearing on TV and web news, duplicated without limits on t-shirts, coffee mugs or 
stickers, similar to a movie star.
His face has been transformed into a symbol, a waving flag among the most extreme fringes 
of the Islamic world; a face that someone swears he has recognized in the majestic columns of 
smoke that  rose  up to the sky after  the  collapse of  the World Trade Center,  as  if  – instigates 
Clément Chéroux – in the most shocking effect of 9/11 we could find impressed no less than the 
mark of its author (Chéroux, 2009). Moreover, that body: tall, thin, placid but resolute, obsessively 
scrutinized by counter-terrorism analysts in search of a detail, a proof or a medical symptom.
Osama bin Laden was a  political  leader with no official  portraiture,  with no monuments 
erected in his honour or memory – indeed, “no statues, monuments, palaces or regimes could be 
levelled as ways of performing the destruction of bin Laden” (Mitchell, 2011: 3) – but he was also a  
leader who did not renounce a personal iconography, able to use TV and the Internet as the most 
powerful  spaces  of  self-promotion.  They are  public  spaces,  obviously,  but  they  have also  been 
modified to fit a domestic and pocket-size dimension; spaces where the image of the most wanted 
public enemy has been continuously reproduced for the eyes of a global audience.
His body was so attractive that it was necessary to hide it after his death. Indeed, bin Laden is 
a denied corpse too, removed from everyone's gaze, a corpse that seems to lie in the depths of the  
ocean because of the effect that its mediatic exhibition would have caused, or the creation – for 
that body – of a place of pilgrimage. He was a stranger, becoming more and more familiar, to such 
an extent that people started to call him by the pronoun He, according to the waxwork sculpture 
created by Cuban artists Manolo Castro, Julio Lorente and Alberto Lorente, that represents bin 
Laden lying down on a rug, head on a pillow and an all-peaceful facial expression: an effort to 
provide us with that missing “last image”6.
On May 2nd,  2011,  after  the  assault  on bin  Laden's  shelter  in  Abbottabad,  Pakistan,  U.S.  
Special Forces found several documents (recently disclosed) and unreleased videos. One of them 
exerts a peculiar fascination: it is not the usual call to the holy war, not even the last admonition to  
the heretic West; it rather consists in a moment of ordinary life, an informal and intimate situation 
in which an old bin Laden (with a grey beard, black headgear and a heavy blanket on his shoulders) 
6 The work has been exhibited during the 11th Havana Biennial (2012).
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watches on a TV screen some videos that represent him. Filmed in three-quarter view, with the left  
side profile quite recognizable, bin Laden holds a TV remote control in his hand and examines the 
menu on the monitor.  Around him, a cluttered and unidentified space,  similar  to  a basement, 
where many devices are stacked and a white electrical cord dangles from the ceiling7.
The image shows bin Laden while he is looking at himself:  a coherent conclusion for his 
iconic march, initiated with the aim of guaranteeing a relevant role in the international political  
arena for himself and his organization, even though in absentia (indeed, bin Laden's main concern 
was clearly to get away from a true manhunt). This means that bin Laden produces and releases 
video-messages using his  body as  a symbolic figure (capable of  easily  changing in response to 
political decisions or military campaigns), thus demonstrating great concern with his own mise-en-
scène.
In  fact,  bin  Laden's  ten-year  iconic  production  can  be  divided  into  three  main different 
phases: the first (autumn 2001) when, after the attacks in the U. S., bin Laden depicts himself as an  
Islamic knight; the second one (between Afghani and Iraqi wars), characterized by a “Franciscan” 
iconography; the last one (from the presidential election of 2004 to his death in 2011), when bin  
Laden appears more similar to an international diplomat than a terroristic leader (Uva, 2008).  
However, the most important factor is the common will to expose his body and to stage his “set”  
with a  very explicit  symbolic  intent,  as  if  his  video-messages were the steps of  a complex and 
recurring self-filmography. 
Christian Uva underlines that bin Laden does not use new media solely to promote them as a 
resounding loud-speaker to spread his political and religious declarations, but also to advertise his 
own image with the expertise of a real director (Uva, 2008: 73), in such a way that it is possible to 
claim  that,  from  bin  Laden's  iconic  birth  to  his  invisible  death,  his  body  became  the  visual 
quintessence  of  a  whole  organization,  an  interface  in  charge  of  communicating  with  both  the 
Western and the Islamic world.
We have to evaluate bin Laden's iconic production as an effort to impose on the market of 
political and religious symbology a really  global product, one that appeals to the Islamic world 
stressing the orthodox traditionalism of bin Laden's appearance (a man of faith devoted to Allah, at 
the same time pious and extremist, an ancient figure that reappears in present day time preserving 
the  ancient  symbols  of  the  caliphate)  and  also  refers  to  the  West,  parading  a  wide  set  of 
technological  devices,  such as digital watches,  microphones,  satellite systems, video recordings, 
Internet connection and so on (Amadori, 2002).
Therefore, the large number of video-messages conceived, produced and performed by the 
Saudi sheik reveals its efficiency both by seducing his followers and terrorizing his enemies and 
makes an intelligent use of a combination of old Islamic symbols and modern media: the result is a 
serialized tale, a self-centred saga whose episodes are broadcast from time to time on TV and web 
platforms, addressing an increasingly wider and miscellaneous public.
Moreover, the variations observed in bin Laden’s self-configuration represent different roles 
7 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xilyxx_pentagon-cia-video-osama-bin-laden-in-abbottabad-pakistan_tech  .
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and embody different characters, constituting three peculiar acting performances that describe the 
chameleonic relationship existing between bin Laden and his own image. Engaged in a constant 
attempt to depict himself in many different ways, bin Laden assembles his personal video-gallery 
converting his physical absence into an iconic omnipresence, as a ghost that combines monstrosity  
and invisibility, hiding himself but suddenly striking and then re-appearing – albeit fleeting – in 
the fluid immateriality of image.
Like a new media preacher, or a fugitive who shows himself in the digital evanescence, bin 
Laden has long been replaced by his images, even if he missed the appointment with his very last  
one (the image of his corpse). In this sense, bin Laden represents a bizarre kind of bogeyman, an  
“absent enemy” increasingly recognized in the form of a voice on a tape or an image on a screen,  
constituting a case of paradoxical (dis)embodiment, as he is “both invisible – an elusive individual 
who evaded capture – and hypervisible – a household brand that represented all terrorism was” 
(Wingard, 2013: 92).  He is a forbidden body which, in order to become an  icon,  combines the 
redundancy of his media representations with “the planning of his own disappearance” (Hill, 2009: 
33).
Therefore,  while  the  self-iconography  of  bin  Laden  seems  to  suggest  a  progressive 
“dematerialization” of his physical body, namely its substitution through the persistent presence of 
digital images, it is possible to note, as a symmetrical effect, a reverse proliferation of bodily images 
too,  not  to  mention the  urgency  to  find  a  possible body with which  to  visualize  the  leader  of 
international terrorism. An example of this can be found in general Western media rhetoric and, in 
particular, in the final part of Kathryn Bigelow's Zero Dark Thirty, when, recreating the assault on 
the compound of Abbottabad, the director chooses to show bin Laden with a phantasmal aspect, 
thanks to the effect of infrared night vision cameras installed on the soldiers' helmets. 
A real “final” image: the shahid's video-testament
Regarding the second case study, it seems evident that one of the most shocking characters in post-
9/11 war imagination has surely been the Islamic shahid. This term – which literally means both 
martyr and  witness –  defines a recurring figure in the horizon of Islamic radicalism, that is,  a 
person who decides to sacrifice his own life in order to kill as many enemies as possible, assigning  
to his action of death a powerful symbolic value and a vigorous media resonance (not by chance, in 
recent years the  shahid has become the protagonist of not only frightful breaking news, but also 
cinematographic  and television  entertainment).  Also  named  kamikaze  –  although  this  term is 
improper, as it refers to a completely different war suicide context (Sacco, 2005)8 – the shahid is an 
8 Sacco argues that the main difference between the two terms lies in their respective fields of pertinence: indeed, if  
“kamikaze”  refers  to  a  particular  action promoted by the  Empire  of  Japan  during  WWII,  when Japanese  pilots 
crashed their  planes into American aircraft  carriers with the  political aim to protect  and honor their  homeland, 
“shahid” refers specifically to the most radical fringe of Islamic culture, where holy suicide is an action considered as a 
religious instrument that allows one to gain the eternal life in the hereafter. 
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orthodox believer who decides to deliver his “testimony of faith” to the world: as a martyr, he kills 
himself in the name of a “superior cause”.
The origins and meaning (as well as geographic distribution) of Islamic martiropatia (Guolo, 
2002) are not easy to define, and their relationship with religion is also hard to profile: Quran 
forbids suicide (even if not unequivocally), and in general Islamic countries have the lowest suicide 
rates in the world. In addition, in the Quranic tradition martyrs die in battle, falling under enemies' 
shots: they do not kill themselves on purpose.
Nevertheless, it is possible to claim that, in Islamic religion, martyrdom is considered as a 
cultural framework initially identifiable as a Shiite specificity (an Islamic minority branch where 
the theology of self-sacrifice finds rich soil  for historical reasons).  Indeed, the radicalization of 
Islam has increased significantly since the last  decades of  the past  century,  particularly  in two 
different contexts: the Iranian Revolution and the Lebanese Civil War.
In the first case, the uprising against the Shah and the Iran-Iraqi War promoted a diffusion of 
martyrdom never before observed in the history of Iran and probably of the whole Islam; in the 
second case, the suicidal martyrs who attacked the Israeli occupation forces were connected to the 
Shiite  representation  of  Hezbollah  (the  “Party  of  God”)  and  contributed  to  make  Beirut  the 
background for a significant increase in the number of martyrs.
Therefore, in Iran and Lebanon the shahid inaugurated an intensive recourse to holy death as 
an  unavoidable  fact,  an  outcome  which  may  be  the  result  of  the  inclusion  of  subjects  in  an 
upsetting modernity that tackles its contradictions (inside and outside Islam) with a politicization 
of religion – a process that shatters no less than the precepts that prevented someone from killing 
himself. In this initial phase, the choice of suicidal death was typical among swerving young people 
who belong to the lowest levels of society, urbanized for no more than two generations.
After a ten-year period, the Palestinian context imported martyrdom into the perimeter of 
the Sunni doctrine, presenting some affinities with the Iranian and Lebanese cases, namely the 
ambition to emphasize national identity through the consolidation of a religious glue (obviously, 
the Palestinian idea of  nation does not refer to an existing reality, as in Iran and Lebanon, but 
rather indicates a future goal).
The First and Second Palestinian Intifada were the turning points of this escalation. In the 
First, martyrdom took on a rather symbolic role, subordinated to less destructive forms of rebellion 
against the Israeli authority: the shahid's first attack happened in 1994, but the young Palestinian's 
silhouette  who throws stones  at  Israeli  tanks  is  the  clash  emblem to  this  day.  In  the Second, 
martyrs'  photographs  were  affixed  everywhere  in  occupied  Palestinian  territories:  indeed,  the 
shahid's presence, quantitatively more relevant in this phase, was perceived by the collectivity as a 
form of testimony able to generate and spread a feeling of national belonging. Martyrs' actions 
started to be more and more encouraged,  propagating by means  of  press,  television or  public  
spaces photographic covering.  Moreover,  a membership organization (often Hamas) led off  the 
process that transforms the shahid from individual to martyr.
Concurrently,  the  circulation  of  suicide  bombers'  video-claims  also  started  taking  place, 
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earlier in VHS format, then as digital files. The video recording constituted the peak of the shahid's 
rituals of indoctrination, because before giving vent to his lethal action, the shahid used to record a 
video with the aim of asserting the authorship of his imminent gesture, praying and thanking Allah 
and bidding farewell to the world, exactly as in the case of an audiovisual testament (Simon, 2009).
Interestingly,  the  first  video-testaments  consist  of  raw  and  unrefined  contents  and  are  very 
primitive versions if compared with the videos shot in the digital age – as a kind of prototype,  
characterized by a simple and basic composition and consisting, in most cases, of a single long take 
focused on the shahid's body and face, with an American shot or a close-up. Also, the set is staged 
in an elementary way: drapes, banners, flags and posters are used to disguise the space (making it 
unrecognizable)  with  unsophisticated  solutions.  Moreover,  a  great  amount  of  weapons  (guns, 
bombs, rocket launchers) is often exhibited in front of the camera, as a sort of menacing threat.
The video-testaments shot after Al-Qaeda's sudden burst in the new media scenario are very 
different instead. Indeed, Al-Qaeda is a terroristic organization that does not promote martyrdom 
solely as an instrument used to create or reinforce a sense of national belonging, but also as a 
vehicle to reach a more articulated goal: the construction of an Islamic trans-national Ummah, that 
is not a territorial but a religious community composed by Sunni brothers who share the same faith 
(that is, a community that overrides traditional geo-political boundaries). 
In  this  perspective,  relevant  discontinuities  emerge  between  pre and  post Al-Qaeda 
martyrdom. Firstly, after Qaedists'  reinforcement, the  shahid's object of desire is no longer the 
individual  in his  relationship with the nation,  but with the community:  this is  a  crucial  point, 
because the global  Jihad, unlike other blurry Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic purposes, is an “effort” 
contextualized both in Islamic countries and in Western societies, where radical Islam increasingly 
tries to take root (for example, in European and U.S. main cities). 
Secondly, the recruitment of martyrs becomes an activity that does not involve marginalized 
and  alienated  subjects  any  longer.  According  to  Farhad  Khosrokhavar's  definition,  the  “new 
martyrs” (Khosrokhavar, 2002) frequently come from the middle-class, they have no problems of 
social  integration and they can benefit  from a high education level,  unlike the average of their 
fellow citizens (they usually complete their studies abroad, as in the case of many 9/11 attackers). 
In  third  place,  post  9/11  video-testaments  constitute  real  global  projects:  they  dominate  the 
contemporary political and religious symbology (concerning both Western and Islamic world) and 
they play an important role in our media landscape, a system where advanced technological devices  
and innovative communication platforms are used.
Finally,  the  technical  aspects  of  the  videos  are  considerably  different  too.  Post-Al-Qaeda 
video-testaments are generally footages composed of miscellaneous images (not simple long takes) 
which seem submitted to  a heterogeneous logic,  rather  than a  linear  one.  Moreover,  it  is  now 
possible to recognize an intense use of special visual effects, absent in previous prototypes: in this  
way, testaments acquire a spectacular and artificial appearance and the set becomes the result of a 
digital configuration, a backdrop composed of different images. This means that the cover-up of the 
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set is now obtained with a digital trick, no longer with a physical space staging9.
Therefore, even if it may seem unexpected, the shahid acts as a subject that does not entirely 
demonstrate an intimate connection with his last image. Indeed, the martyr, seated in front of the 
camera merely repeating written speeches, often composed by other people, declaims passages of 
the  Quran  or  appeals  to  Allah  with  the  usual  formulas,  recurrent  in  Islamic  tradition;  as  a  
consequence, in some way, he “solves” the contact with his own image resorting to an impersonal  
and other-directed terroristic performance (Dayan, 2006). 
The outcome is a gesture of self-configuration that does not consist in the result of an open 
relationship  between  a  subject  and  his  conception  of  himself,  but  in  an  image  that,  although 
created in a very reserved context, is already born as a public message, just waiting to circulate in  
the global media system to fully emphasize its spectacular hyperactivity. To support this claim, it is 
useful to underline that several video-testaments include images that represent the shahid's final 
action (namely, his attack), and whose materials were necessarily added to the footage after his 
death: images that the shahid has never seen and will never see.
In conclusion,  it  is  possible  to suggest a  key for interpretation.  The self-configurative  gestures  
performed by both Osama bin Laden and the shahid consist of processes that, at first glance, could 
seem very personal and intimate; instead, these gestures are performed in a collective and choral 
dimension that,  on the one hand, requires the presence of  other terrorists on the scene (even 
though they are  not  involved in  the gaze  of  the  camera)  and,  on the other  hand,  needs some 
significant post-production intervention to give the video-testament its ultimate and public form. 
It is, therefore, an operation comparable to a “proxy”, “a mandate”, that considers external 
assistance not only helpful  but even indispensable  (although the framework within which it  is  
carried out is the  self-portraiture), at least to confer the videos shot by Al-Qaeda's members the 
value  of  high  circulation  contents  in  the  context  of  new  media,  in  order  to  reach  as  many 
addressees as possible.
According to the authors' original intentions, there is not an ideal or well-defined addressee, 
since, according to Al-Qaeda's objectives, it does not matter  who watches the video, but that the 
video  is  watched,  replicated and remediated in the global  communication circuits.  As Mitchell 
wrote, the most important thing concerning the terrorists' iconic strategies is that a video must 
work as a virus, a material that infects the nervous system of communications, as is the case of an 
epidemic disease or an “autoimmune disorder” (2011: 45)10. 
This open idea of the addressee attributes to Al-Qaeda's video-testaments a function that 
exceeds the canonical idea of self-configurative presence. Therefore, under these circumstances, 
9 As it is evident, for instance, in Ahmad al-Haznawi’s or in Abdulaziz al-Omari’s video-testaments, two suicide killers 
involved in the 9/11 attacks (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlW39yVsQw0; https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=7T65faJSt8c).
10 Quoting  a  Jacques  Derrida’s  metaphor,  Mitchell  claims that  autoimmunity  is  a  condition  that  occurs  when  the  
immune system mistakenly attacks and destroys healthy body tissue. In Mitchell's words: “Like almost everyone who 
attempted to picture the dynamics of  terrorism and its effects on the social  body,  Derrida turned to a biological  
metaphor,  but one focused on the defense mechanism of the organism itself,  rather than on the usual picture of  
terrorism as a foreign invasion by alien microbes” (2011: 45). 
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representation becomes a term that,  in our iconic perspective,  can be interpreted at least  in a 
double sense11. The first is representation as the process of self-portraying, that is, putting oneself 
into the image in order to create a virtual self-equivalent. In the presence of it, the subject can say  
“Here I am!” and is able to recognize himself in something “external”. This meaning is obviously 
related to the idea of a new presentation (re-presentation) of the subject, his transformation into 
an  image  through  a  process  of  self-definition  that  considers  the  image  as  a  copy,  a  mimetic 
duplicate. 
The second is representation  as the process of being substituted by the image. In this case, the 
subject  has  to  face  an  image  that  acts  “instead  of”  him,  as  an  iconic  appearance  related to  a 
physical absence. As a result, the image performs the role of a substitute that acts on behalf of the 
subject and consequently its role changes too, shifting from the function of copy to the function of 
presence;  in  this  sense,  its  attitude  is  no longer  only  mimetic  or  repetitive,  but  becomes fully 
operative. Once again, it is important to distinguish between this idea of a vicarious presence of the 
image and the idea of simulacrum, that we have discussed in the beginning of the article: in fact, if 
the second consists of an ontological radicalization – maybe we could call it a “dramatization” – of  
the relationship between facts and their iconic representation that nowadays seems to have become 
obsolete,  the  first  can  instead  prove  very  useful  to  understand  both  the  mechanisms  of 
contemporary circulation of images in our mediascape and their connection with reality.
Finally, I would like to conclude by giving particular relevance to this second acceptation of 
“representation”, an important vector to study the “production of presence” (Gumbrecht, 2004) 
promoted by Islamic radicalism after the 9/11 attacks, especially moving from a self-configurative 
point of view. In fact, the recording of a video-message (Osama bin Laden) or a video-testament 
(the  shahid) initiates a process that basically replaces a body with a digital  content,  allowing a 
virtual  image  (the  video)  to  substitute  –  I  repeat:  not  as  a  simulacrum,  but  as  an  operative 
presence – a biological image (the body) in the global visibility.
After all, if bin Laden is a fugitive, a body that must remain hidden appearing only in the 
video digital elusiveness, then the  shahid, after his death, is also  replaced by an image, a video-
testament that continues his holy war in the media system. Two cases that show how these very 
peculiar self-configurative images demonstrate – so to speak – the desire  to be  and not just  to 
seem: they want to represent an active substitute for the subject and not simply his copy; they want 
to  continue a mission when the subject  is  absent,  or,  as  in the body-bomber's  case,  when the 
subject is no longer alive.
11 In italian two different words exist to indicate the two meanings: rappresentazione vs rappresentanza.
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